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ABSTRACT 
In the two decades after World War II Meyer Fortes was a central figure in what 
was then called ‘British social anthropology’.  Sometimes dismissed as simply a 
follower of Radcliffe-Brown, Fortes’ theoretical influences in fact ranged from 
Freud to Parsons. He formulated a distinctive theoretical synthesis, and 
produced the most influential version of ‘descent theory’. Fortes is currently out 
of fashion, but four decades after his retirement from the Cambridge chair a 
revaluation is in order.  
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Meyer Fortes: the person, the role, the theory 
 
Adam Kuper 
 
I 
 
In July, 2015, Heonik Kwon convened a small conference to discuss the legacy of 
Meyer Fortes (William Wyse professor of social anthropology at Cambridge, 1950-
1973). A number of the participants had been students in the Cambridge 
department in the 1960s. This was a small unit in those days, but with two 
rivalrous leaders: Meyer Fortes himself, and Edmund Leach. They were locked into 
an absorbing, stimulating debate on questions of theory and ethnography. We 
followed every twist and turn, argued among ourselves, and our doctoral theses 
took up the questions they raised. It does all seem a long time ago, and these 
debates are now seldom cited.  
     My own talk was directed particularly at my fellow students, who are as familiar 
with Fortes and his work as I am myself.  Writing it up for publication I have tried 
to cater for readers who never had to steep themselves in Tallensi ethnography, or 
been made to struggle with the minutiae of debates on descent and filiation. I have, 
however, kept the conversational tone of the introduction because this is at once a 
personal and an analytical accounting, and I cannot entirely separate my responses 
to the man I knew, and the ideas he developed. But then nor could he. 
 
I remember Meyer Fortes, fondly, as do most of his former students, and perhaps 
here and there I may be indulging in a spot of ancestor worship. Obviously, 
ancestor worship is particularly appropriate in Meyer’s case. That was, after all, a 
topic on which he wrote some illuminating essays. He often pointed out that a 
function of ancestor worship is to bolster the authority of the living elders, and 
that may also help to explain why some former students are inclined to be a little 
too reverential when discussing his work. But as soon as I say that I am 
reminded – and precisely because I have been rereading Meyer’s later essays – 
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that there is always an element of ambivalence and resentment in ancestor 
worship. (See Fortes, 1987.) 
     Even if ancestor worship is avoided, there may be an impulse to indulge in 
Confucian filial piety, if only because Meyer Fortes’ standing is not what it was. 
Half a century ago, he was a respected figure in what had come to be called 
British social anthropology. Probably in large part because that whole project 
has lost favour, Meyer’s own reputation has suffered.  In fact he is less well 
regarded today than are some of his contemporaries who rebelled against 
functionalism – notably Evans-Pritchard, perhaps Max Gluckman, and, of course, 
Meyer’s maddening confrère, Edmund Leach.  
     But it is not only that functionalism is now completely out of fashion. Fortes’ 
central contribution was to kinship studies, and that too is now hardly practiced 
or taught, except in the manner of Schneider and the latter-day Sahlins, as an 
account of ideological constructions of common substance, or even more loosely, 
by way of generalised talk of ‘relationships’. I recognize that partisans of the new 
‘kinship’ studies will object to this perhaps too blunt, certainly too brief, 
characterization, but this is not the place to discuss the pros and cons. (My views 
are set out in Kuper, 1999, chapter 4 and Kuper, 2013.)  For present purposes, let 
us simply agree that the debates about formal kinship structures that so 
preoccupied anthropologists – and nowhere more than in Cambridge – through 
the 1970s are currently unfashionable.  
    It is true, also, that Fortes published less than other leading contemporaries, 
and it does not help that he wrote in a dry, convoluted style that is anything but 
reader-friendly. Moreover, his publications had a very limited scope, considering 
that they spanned forty years. They were concerned mainly with kinship, 
descent and ancestor worship, largely with reference to the Tallensi. And when it 
came to theory, Fortes remained faithful throughout to a limited set of 
authorities, while reading each in a rather idiosyncratic fashion.    
      The key figures in his personal theoretical pantheon were Malinowski, 
Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, and Freud. Henry Maine was invoked to endorse a 
legalistic approach to social structure. Evans-Pritchard was a brotherly associate 
and occasional critic. Later there was also Talcott Parsons, though he was seldom 
acknowledged by Fortes. These theoretical influences had been absorbed and 
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aligned with one another by the time Fortes wrote his Tallensi monographs. 
Parsons was slipped in as Fortes elaborated his framework in programmatic 
papers published in the 1950s, at a time when his professorial colleagues – 
Evans-Pritchard, Firth, Nadel, Gluckman and Leach – issued their manifestos for 
a post-functionalist anthropology. (This was a time when every professor had to 
have a theory.) 
     Like a Fortesian primitive society, Meyer Fortes’ theory was stable, bolstered 
by authority, and resistant to change. His most extensive late statement, Kinship 
and the Social Order, the Lewis Henry Morgan lectures, delivered in 1963 but 
obsessively reworked before publication in 1969, rehearsed long-held positions.  
       Latterly he simply passed over theoretical movements in the discipline, or 
waved them away with a dismissive aphorism. He dealt obliquely with the 
challenge of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism (e.g., Fortes 1966), and, exceptionally, 
engaged in a polemical exchange with Leach over alliance theory. This direct 
challenge from a close colleague really could not be ignored. (See Leach, 1952, 
1957, 1960, 1966 and Fortes, 1959 and 1969, pp. 250-75. For a review of the 
debate see Barnes, 1962.) In general, however, he ignored critics and 
contemporary theorists. 
 
II 
     
Fortes made his name with two monographs on the Tallensi of northern Ghana. His 
account of Tallensi clanship (1945) followed Evans-Pritchard’s path-breaking 
analysis of the segmentary lineage system among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), 
but his second monograph, on the ‘web of kinship’ (1949), appeared before Evans-
Pritchard’s equivalent account, Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer (1951). In fact 
the two sets of monographs formed a coherent package, directly inspired by 
Radcliffe-Brown. Together they offered a paradigmatic account of social systems 
organized into corporate descent groups. But while Evans-Pritchard’s model of the 
Nuer system was notably clear and abstract, Fortes on the Tallensi was more 
concerned with ethnographic detail, his analysis replete with qualifications, much less 
cut and dried.  
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    In Fortes’ account, Tallensi lineages did not present a neat Nuer-like pattern of 
‘nesting’ lineage segments. The clans were also fuzzier constructs than their Nuer 
counterparts, as described by Evans-Pritchard. Some Tallensi clans were exogamous, 
others endogamous. They were not mechanically ordered by genealogical connection, 
however fictitious. Clan ties might be based on spatial proximity. In fact it was often 
difficult to distinguish clan ties from neighbourhood relationships. Nor was clan 
membership clearly defined. ‘Clanship ties cut across clans’, Fortes wrote, and he was 
forced to define a clan as ‘the region where the fields of clanship of two or more 
lineages have the maximum overlap.’ (Fortes, 1945, 63.) Some clans were ordered on 
principles so uncertain that Fortes was obliged to distinguish a further category of 
‘extra-clan ties of clanship’. (Fortes, 1949, chapter 11.) 
    Following Evans-Pritchard’s account of the Nuer, Fortes proposed that Tallensi 
lineages were divided into levels, which he termed minimal, medial and maximal 
lineage segments. In practice Fortes found that the Tallensi lineage segements were 
difficult to distinguish. ‘As usual in Tali social organization no rigorous criterion can 
be found.’ (Fortes, 1949, 203.) ‘These distinctions are not made by the natives,’ he 
admitted. Moreover, ‘it should be noted that the Tallensi have no term for the 
lineage.’ (Fortes, 1945, 10.) Later, however, in his programmatic statements of the 
descent model, these complications and approximations were set aside.  
 
III 
 
After his appointment to the Cambridge chair Fortes began to made broader 
theoretical pronouncements, taking a strongly positivist line.  ‘The new frame of 
reference for anthropological science will have to be worked out on the model of 
the experimental natural sciences.’  Its method must involve ‘testing, amending 
and adding to the generalisations which make up the body of social 
anthropological theory by the intensive study of one society at a time.’ (Fortes, 
1953 (b), 191-2.)  
    The subject-matter of anthropology was custom and social organization in 
‘primitive’ societies. ‘Custom’ is ‘the behaviour that is standardized, expected and 
often enforced in a particular situation in a community’ (Fortes, 1951, 332). It is 
rooted in emotions, and gives conventional form and expression to deep feelings. 
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‘Custom is in fact the equivalent of unconscious emotional forces,’ and customs 
‘provide a legitimate – one might also say a conscious – outlet for the 
contradictory emotions built up’ in childhood.’ (1956, 794; 1957, 172).   
    Custom was perhaps Meyer Fortes’ preferred synonym for ‘culture’, a term he 
avoided using. Addressing a readership of American cultural anthropologists, he 
tried to bridge what they meant by culture and what he meant by custom. ‘We 
see custom as symbolizing or expressing social relations – that is, the ties and 
cleavages by which persons are bound to one another in the activities of social 
life. In this sense social structure is not an aspect of culture but the entire culture 
of a given people handled in a special frame of theory.’ (1953 (a), 21.) The social 
structure is a different matter, more fundamental than ‘culture’, shaped by 
political forces, made manifest in quasi-legal rules.  
      In the ‘tribal’ societies with which Fortes was primarily concerned, the 
politico-jural domain was formed by clan and lineage, the domestic domain by 
the family. Underlying the whole social system was a biological bedrock of sex, 
childbirth, maturation and death. These constraints played out in the first place 
within the nuclear family. And the nuclear family was the foundation of the social 
order: ‘the actor’s model for the structure of social groups and relationships at all 
levels derives from the nuclear field of social reproduction – the constellation of 
parents and children… it is the experience of the elementary social relations of 
filiation and siblingship … that is the basis of a person’s conception of his social 
identity.’ (Fortes, 1987, 123.) 
    But Fortes did not accept a doctrine, shared by Malinowski and Radcliffe-
Brown, that primitive social structure was simply an elaboration of the kinship 
system. The political system, made up of clans and lineages, was represented in a 
kinship idiom but it constituted an independent source of ‘jural’ rights and 
duties. This public ‘politico-jural domain’ was distinct from and independent of 
the private, familial ‘domestic domain’. The politico-jural domain had to do with 
rights and duties, the domestic domain with custom, emotion and ethical ethical 
imperatives.  The values that derived from the experience of growing up in a 
nuclear family had a moral character. The ‘jural’ politically sanctioned norms 
that emanated from the public domain  were of a different order. (For a 
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statement of the model, see Fortes, 1953 (a). For a critical overview of this 
‘descent model’ of ‘tribal societies see Kuper, 1982.) 
     In every tribal society one principle of descent – matrilineal or patrilineal – is 
drawn on to establish a system of corporate groups, the clans and lineages. This 
determines political allegiance and regulates inheritance and succession. But 
every person relies also on the private moral relationships of ‘complementary 
filiation’, traced through the mother in a patrilineal society, through the father in 
a matrilineal society. The interplay between the politico-jural and domestic 
domains is made manifest in the contrast between the value and use of descent 
and filiation, two principles of relationship that are ‘always complementary in 
their action’  (Fortes, 1944, 379) and which ‘run like a cry and its echo’ through 
the social system of the Tallensi (Fortes, 1949, 30).   
      Malinowski had represented the Trobriand family man as a divided person, 
torn between the external demands of his matriclan and his emotional bond with 
his son. Fortes countered that family emotions were efficiently harnessed to 
support the clan system. Following Freud, he identified a different source of 
internal conflict. This pitted a father against his first-born son. (There is surely a 
biographical element here. Fortes had a difficult relationship with an erratic, 
sometimes violent father.) What was in essence an Oedipal conflict had 
somehow to be contained, or managed. Among the Tallensi this work was done 
by the ancestor cult.   
    Fortes saw the Tallensi ancestor cult as a projection of the complex of moral 
impulses that are fostered in the family. ‘The binding force of custom among the 
Tallensi depends, in the final analysis, on their ancestor cult, and … the key to 
this lies in their family and kinship system.’ (Fortes, 1987, 191-2.) Reciprocally, 
the moral authority of the father and of the lineage head relies on his 
relationship with his ancestors. This should not be understood as simply a 
Durkheimian matter of ritual reinforcement of social norms. In Fortes’ view, 
strains between a father and his first-born son are projected onto the 
‘ambivalent’ relationship that the Tallensi have with their punitive and yet 
protective ancestors, who are at once feared and loved. ‘In short, it seems to me 
that it is not too farfetched to compare the Tallensi image of their ancestors to 
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the internalized parent figure of the classical Freudian super-ego.’ (Fortes, 1987, 
210-11).  
    The one aspect of the Oedipal relationship that interested Fortes was the 
tension that it caused between a boy and his father, and more generally it is 
remarkable how little women figure in Fortes’ account of the Tallensi, except as 
idealized mothers who are above all conduits of ties of complementary filiation 
for men. ‘The dug (that is, a woman and her children by one man) constitutes the 
irreducible unit of Tale social structure, both jurally and morally’ (Fortes, 1949, 
62). He did, however, indicate that, like d fathers, mothers and maternal kin were 
viewed ambivalently. Witchcraft and tyuk, a form of malign fate, are associated 
with relatives on the mother’s side of the family. In a footnote, Fortes remarked 
on ‘an interesting psychological problem here …. Tyuk and witchcraft might be 
regarded as the male and female aspects, respectively, of deep-seated vindictive 
impulses connected with the mother.’ (Fortes, 1949, 35-37.) 
     The most basic assumption is that men – and Fortes was concerned almost 
exclusively with men – are social actors, that is, in his terms, ‘persons’, who have 
specific roles in the two main domains of action, the domestic and the politico-
jural. The elements of personhood are gradually accumulated over a lifetime. 
Taking office, an individual becomes the occupant of a role with established 
rights and duties. This role obliges him to serve a public purpose. Yet he remains 
a private person, and it is necessary to develop his moral commitment to this 
public purpose. Investiture rituals therefore draw on sentiments that derive 
from the basic moral experience, the experience of family life. Personhood is to 
be understood in processual terms, as a journey that is completed only by death 
and incorporation as an ancestor. This is the day of judgement, for ‘it is only 
when the person is dissolved into his or her constituent parts and statuses that 
his claims to genuine personhood can be evaluated.’ (Fortes, 1987, 265.) 
    ‘Time and social structure’ (1949), perhaps Fortes’ most seminal essay, is in 
some ways an oddity in his oeuvre. His Ashanti data evidently came out of his 
work on the Ashanti Social Survey, which he directed, rather than from his own 
ethnographic fieldwork.  (He seems to have done little field research in Ashanti.) 
Also, this is the only study in which he relied on – indeed, had access to – 
statistical data. And in this essay, unusually, he used the idea of a norm in the 
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statistical sense. His statistical analysis has been criticized on methodological 
grounds, but the enduring contribution of the essay was the introduction of the 
model of ‘the developmental cycle of the domestic group’. This model was 
deployed in order to refute Rattray’s proposition that differences in Ashanti 
household composition were symptoms of an evolutionary change from 
matriliny to patriliny. Fortes countered that the different forms of household 
corresponded to stages in a single developmental cycle.  
     Despite its original features, this essay fits in perfectly well with the Fortesian 
paradigm. The drivers of the developmental cycle are Fortes’ familiar duo, the 
life cycle and the forces of law and emotion, lineage and family, that produce 
strains between the obligations of a woman to her husband and to her brother, 
and between a man’s loyalty to his father and his mother’s brother. (Fortes, 
1971.) For Malinowski, these conflicts were the source of a constant strain in 
matrilineal societies, which might be finessed by patrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage. Among the Ashanti, Fortes argued, they were resolved in the course of 
the developmental cycle, as children grew up and switched their affiliation from 
father to mother’s brother. 
 
IV 
 
Broadly speaking, Fortes’ understanding of the political structure and its ritual 
supports derives from Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown. The account of the 
domestic domain draws on Malinowski and Freud.  
      For much of his career, probably for reasons of academic politics, Fortes 
played down the influence of Freudian ideas on his work, although in unguarded 
conversation he could be clear about his Freudian allegiance. As a young man he 
was influenced by a leading figure in British psychoanalysis, J. C. Flügel, and 
perhaps his second marriage, to a psychoanalytically oriented child psychiatrist, 
revived his interest, but it was only after retirement from his Cambridge chair 
that he addressed psychoanalytical meetings and published strong 
endorsements of Freudian theory in psychoanalytical journals. Yet his Freudian 
interests were nevertheless apparent from the first, even if psychoanalytic 
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observations appear in the Tallensi monographs mainly in footnotes, which form 
a sort of Talmudic commentary on the text.  
     It is perhaps odd to find Freud linked to Durkheim, but Fortes did not see 
these two ancestral figures as representing conflicting theoretical positions. He 
told me several times that Jewish thinkers such as Freud and Durkheim – and, he 
implied, himself – were especially sensitive to the moral power of social 
institutions, to the ways in which social values were internalized, impressed on 
the consciousness of each individual.  Like Freud, he believed that the 
fundamental dynamics were universal, because they derived from experiences 
within the family. With Durkheim, he believed that these moral sentiments are 
expressed and regenerated in ritual.  
      Although his debt to Parsons was only occasionally, and obliquely, signaled, it 
seems obvious enough. Parsons was the most influential theorist of structural-
functionalism in the 1950s, and when Fortes came to Cambridge he brought in 
two visiting professors of social theory: first Radcliffe-Brown and then, in 1953-
1954, Talcott Parsons, with whom he had established friendly relations when 
Parson spent a term as a member of Malinowski’s seminar. Parsons argued for 
the integration of social, psychological and biological perspectives, presenting a 
sophisticated alternative to Malinowski’s functionalist reductionism. He also had 
a sympathetic interest in Freudian theory. More particularly, and most 
importantly from Fortes’ point of view, Parsons introduced two crucial analytical 
ideas. First, there are distinct domains of social life, each with its particular 
system of values. Second, the social actor has a particular role in each domain, 
and the social ‘person’ is the sum of a set of roles. Both these ideas, present in 
embryo in the Trobriand monographs, became central features of Fortes’ theory. 
     Interestingly enough, on one of the few occasions when he directly invoked 
Parsons, this was to endorse Fortes’ own view of the relationship between 
Durkheim and Freud – and Malinowski.  In a passage that provides a good 
example of how he yoked together his various theoretical influences, Fortes 
argued: 
that there is an overlap between Durkheim’s concept of collective 
representations and Freud’s concept of the superego. Durkheim, says 
Parsons, described collective representations as emanating from the total 
 11 
society and as characterized by the moral constraints they exert on the 
members of the society. He suggests that this corresponds, at the social 
level, to Freud’s concept of the superego, the internalized representative 
of parental authority, as that is in part shaped and moulded by the social 
structure and the cultural norms and values of the society. Malinowski, 
hostile as he was to Durkheimian notions of collective consciousness, 
would nevertheless, I think, have accepted Parsons’ model, in principle. I 
think he would have agreed that it provides a model of the possible 
processes by which the public and collectively sanctioned norms of 
custom accessible to anthropological observation are incorporated in a 
binding form into the attitudes, motives and behavior patterns of the 
individual. Be this as it may, it can plausibly be claimed that this model 
corresponds to later developments in anthropological theory and 
research. (Fortes, 1987, 186.) 
     This passage illustrates a characteristic rhetorical strategy. Fortes authorized 
each element of his model by referring it to a master of social theory, although in 
fact he took only what he thought he needed, and freely edited his sources. The 
resulting synthesis rested on a set of propositions to which impressive labels 
were attached. It was then presented as no more than a restatement of orthodox 
opinion in social anthropology, indeed in social theory: a final act of 
authorization.  
   As John Barnes remarked, Fortes’ positivist programme did not deliver testable 
propositions (Barnes, 1971, 213-4). ‘The apparent contradictions between one 
statement and another are due partly to the style in which Fortes writes,’ he 
commented. ‘Typically, the main conclusion of any argument is first stated in 
oversimplified and uncompromising form, and only later does it become clear 
that this opening statement is to be understood only as a first and inaccurate 
approximation to a subtle and carefully delimited intellectual position.’ (Barnes, 
1971, 259.) I would put down some of the ambiguity to conceptual uncertainties, 
or academic anxieties, which sometimes led to defensively vague formulations. It 
was for similar reasons, perhaps, that Fortes again and again introduced his 
largest and most challenging hypotheses indirectly, or attributed them to an 
unspecified community of experts. ‘It would not, I think, be out of step with 
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modern anthropology theory to say that most, if not all ….’  ‘Be this as it may, it 
can plausibly be claimed that this model corresponds to later developments in 
anthropology and research’. (Fortes, 1987, 7, 18). And so on. 
 
V 
 
Fortes wrote an interesting overview of his career, assessing his own work and 
identifying the main theoretical influences (Fortes, 1978), but it was 
John Barnes – a more than sympathetic commentator – who produced the most 
objective and searching account of Fortes’ work, in his Three Styles in the Study of 
Kinship (1971).  He identified as the crucial element of Fortes’ analytical 
apparatus the distinction of ‘domains’, and within the domains of ‘roles’. (This, I 
suggest, comes from Parsons.) The two domains that frame the analysis, the 
politico-jural and the domestic, are characterized, respectively, by ‘principles’ 
(structural or jural) and ‘axioms’ (kinship-based and moral).  
      Barnes pointed out that the principles and axioms were not always clearly 
formulated by Fortes: ‘we have to deal with a mixed bag of principles, with some 
principles more general than others’, while the axioms ‘are not of equal logical 
status’. (Barnes, 1971, 220, 224.) Fortes regularly characterized axioms as 
‘irreducible’, but Barnes found that it was ‘difficult to give any precise analytical 
meaning to this use of the adjective “irreducible”.’ (Barnes, 1971, 225.) As to the 
notion of the jural, Barnes simply cited Firth’s characterization of it (in a review 
of The Web of Kinship) as obscure, and the distinction between moral and jural 
obligations as vague. (Firth, 1951.)  Following Firth’s criticism, Fortes conceded 
some ground on this matter, so crucial to his approach. ‘The basic distinction 
between the jural aspects and functions of a kinship system and the affective, or 
it we prefer, psychological meanings of the customs and usages in which the 
system comes to expression, has been more difficult to establish than might be 
thought.’ (Fortes, 1955.) 
        Fortes assumed that moral values sustained legal rights and duties, but 
Barnes remarked that he could be vague as to whether ‘norms’ were explicit 
guidelines, even rules of conduct, or rather statistical patterns of choice, that the 
ethnographer worked out from observations of action. Fortes also had little to 
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say about economics strategies, and Barnes implicitly endorsed Peter Worseley’s 
demonstration that the Tallensi kinship system was profoundly influenced by 
economic constraints, factors that Fortes downplayed. (Worseley, 1956.) Nor 
was Fortes concerned with politicking as opposed to political structures. ‘Fortes 
provides in his books the ethnographic evidence for a study of conflict, 
inequality, and political process,’ Barnes noted, ‘but he uses this evidence to 
build up a picture of Tale culture that is timeless and repetitive.’ (Barnes, 1971, 
266.)  
   This presumption of stability, internal consistency and harmony was reinforced 
by Fortes’ refusal to confront history (a point that Worseley also made). Yet the 
Tallensi population had increased significantly since the late 19th century. ‘These 
demographically determined phenomena, alas, require a quite a quite different 
non-cyclical model of Tale society and cannot be accommodated in the internal-
cyclical model Fortes provides.’ (Barnes, 1971, 208.)  
     A Tale intellectual, Moses Anafu, pointed out that:  
When Meyer Fortes began his research in 1934, Taleland had been under 
colonial rule for just two decades, and like many other African 
communities, the coming of the white man had been nothing short of a 
trauma for Tale society. For over a decade they had put up a heroic 
resistance to colonial encroachments in the course of which many 
hundreds had been killed ... When in April 1911, the British finally 
overcame Tale resistance, it was done with something of a vengeance. The 
houses of the Hill Talis were razed to the ground and they themselves 
sent into exile. (Anafu, 1983, 10.) 
Barnes added that ‘[Fortes’] discussion of the pilgrim traffic to the Tong Hills in 
central Taleland which “has brought violent competition into the sphere of the 
common ritual interests and values” of the Hill Talis is relegated to a section on 
“Modern factors of disequilibrium” at the end of the Dynamics of Clanship and 
does not form part of his main analysis.’ (Barnes, 1971, 208-9.) 
     To be sure, Fortes knew all this very well.  In his first paper on the Tallensi he 
remarked that ‘the political and legal behavior of the Tallensi … is as strongly 
conditioned by the ever-felt presence of the District Commissioner as by their 
own traditions’. European influences ‘are so diffuse and pervasive that one has to 
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take account of them in every routine observation of social practices, situations 
and institutions’. Nevertheless, according to Fortes,  ‘the fundamental 
institutions, practices and beliefs of the community seem to be sufficiently 
vigorous to countervail the intrusion of contact influences.’ (1936, 23, 46, 47, 
49). He put this view forward in his contribution to a joint assault, launched 
together with his close associates Schapera and Gluckman, on Malinowski’s 
cultural account of change in African societies. He did not, however, return to 
these observations in his later ethnographic studies. As Barnes noted, Fortes 
‘proceeds on the assumption that Tale society has in fact been stable for an 
indefinite period’. (Barnes, 1971, 206.) 
     This ahistorical approach was bound up with another very basic assumption. 
Social anthropology, according to Fortes, was ‘the analysis of how primitive 
social systems work’. (Fortes, 1951, 339.)  He was convinced that ‘primitive’ or 
‘tribal’ societies were very different from what he called ‘civilised societies’. They 
were small-scale and not very differentiated internally, and that they sustained 
themselves in a state of equilibrium. Civilisation was their nemesis (a view 
shared by Claude Lévi-Strauss). In a paper delivered to a Fabian Society 
conference on colonialism, on the eve of decolonization, Fortes commented that: 
The centre of gravity of the equilibrium characteristic of a stable and 
homogeneous primitive society lies in its scheme of cultural values; and 
that a primitive society undergoing rapid social break-down is apt to 
become a rabble of acquisitive or exploited individuals and the prey of 
irrational mob impulses if they cease to have common cultural values. 
(Fortes, 1945(a), 223.) 
It is not surprising that he and his second wife, Doris Mayer, published a study of 
‘migrant madness’ among Tallensi, in which they argued that the psychological 
balance of many Tallensi had been disrupted by modernity. The title of the paper 
was ‘Psychosis and Social Change’ (Fortes and Mayer, 1966.)  
      When Fortes mounted his campaign against sociology, more specifically 
against the introduction of sociology in Cambridge, his basic argument was that 
anthropology dealt with primitive society, and so was quite different from 
sociology. After all, he noted, introducing his Presidential address to the Royal 
Anthropological Institute in 1966, totem and taboo – the subjects of his talk – 
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were typical of the sorts of things that preoccupied social anthropologists and 
did not interest sociologists at all. More pragmatically, Fortes feared that a 
sociology tripos would draw undergraduates away from anthropology. He fought 
off calls to establish a chair of sociology at Cambridge, but when the university at 
last decided to move, Fortes used his political skills to ensure that the first 
professor of sociology, appointed in 1969, was an anthropologist – none other 
than his friendly critic John Barnes. 
 
VI 
 
In his ‘Glimpses of the Unmentionable’, his essay on social class in British social 
anthropology, published in 1984, Edmund Leach suggested that: 
With varying degrees of enthusiasm and varying degrees of success 
Malinowski, Firth, Schapera, Fortes, Nadel, and the other foreigners who 
were mainly responsible for the high prestige that was attributed to 
‘British’ social anthropology in the 1950s and 1960s … eventually 
assimilated themselves into the lifestyle and cultural conventions of 
Oxbridge academics, but they remained ‘outsiders’ with a highly 
ambivalent attitude towards the values of their adopted academic milieu. 
This ambivalence is both reflected in and a reflection of their approach to 
the study of anthropology.  
… Meyer Fortes serves as an example. His basic social identity was that of 
the son of an impoverished South African Jew of Russian descent. Except 
for a period during the second World War when he returned to West 
Africa, Fortes was associated with faculty of either Oxford or Cambridge 
from late 1939 until his retirement, and for the last thirty-one years of his 
life he lived in Cambridge as a Professorial Fellow (later Honorary Fellow) 
of King’s College. When he arrived from Oxford in 1951, King’s College 
was still a bastian of British upper-class values of the most archaic kind. 
(Leach, 1984, 11.) 
    As an outsider, Fortes was an observer, not a participant, Leach felt: ‘he never 
played an active executive role in College affairs. Indeed to a quite disconcerting 
extent, he never seemed to understand how the system really worked.’ (Leach 
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1984, 12.) Leach also believed, quite wrongly, that Fortes falsely claimed 
Sephardi ancestry because he thought it was posh. 
    In fact, whatever the reasons for his absence from College business, Fortes was 
rather a shrewd operator in university politics. His final coup was to fix his 
succession. Following his retirement, the leading candidates to succeed him to 
the William Wyse chair were Fortes’ lieutenant Jack Goody and Leach’s close 
associate Stanley Tambiah. As it happened, two of Fortes’ close friends, Max 
Gluckman and Isaac Schapera, were among the electors. Schapera told me that 
Fortes asked them to support Goody, who was duly appointed. 
      Politically, Fortes began on the left. Both his wives had been members of the 
Communist Party in the 1930s. Jack Goody has documented the troubles Fortes 
had when the International African Institute was planning to send him to West 
Africa: he was suspected of leftist allegiances and subjected to antisemitic slurs. 
(Goody, 1995, 28-9, 48-54.) Fortes nevertheless quickly established good 
relationships with Gold Coast administrators.  
       Though never a political conservative, he was a cultural traditionalist, in 
Taleland as in Cambridge. But he was a colonial and a Jew, and he had grown up 
in straitened circumstances. The two colleagues with whom he maintained a 
close life-long relationship, Isaac Schapera and Max Gluckman. were fellow South 
African Jews. He and Schapera were contemporaries and came from a very 
similar poor, rural, immigrant background in South Africa. Both he and Fortes 
had won scholarships to the oldest and most distinguished grammar school in 
South Africa, the South African College School. (This was quite a typical 
trajectory for bright young boys from poor families. Schapera once told me that 
Meyer always came top of his class at SACS. Didn’t you? I asked him. No, he said, I 
came second. The boy who came first was called Solly Zuckerman.) While Fortes 
was pleased to find himself solidly established in Oxbridge he never fell for the 
Oxbridge mystique (to which Schapera was wholly immune).  
          At our first lunch, when I turned up in King’s, a raw colonial, Meyer told me, 
‘Never forget, they don’t like Jews here’. Certainly he felt that his background 
made things a bit harder for him, and he could be thin-skinned. He certainly had 
to deal with Colonial Office antisemitism in the 1930’s. (Goody, 1995, 28-9, 48-
54.) But he was secure in his Jewish identity, opposed to intermarriage, 
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occasionally attending synagogue, though never religious or observant, and he 
was unsympathetic to Zionism. When the Nazis launched their onslaught on the 
Jews of Europe, Fortes worked with a secret organization that smuggled Jews 
into England. (I owe this information to his step-son, Karl Mayer.) 
     In Leach’s view, the theoretical orientation of Schapera, Fortes and Gluckman 
was explained by their social situation. ‘Is it too fanciful to suggest that the 
prominence that several of these authors were later to give to the notion of 
homeostatic social equilibrium and to the belief that social structures persist 
even when there are drastic changes in cultural appearances derived from their 
personal need for a stable homeland?’ (Leach, 1984, 12.) This is stretching 
things. Schapera and Gluckman were theoretically at odds with one another, and 
they both differed from Fortes in ways that seemed to them, and I suppose to us, 
significant.  It is more to the point that these men were deeply impressed by the 
same intellectual orthodoxies that they imbibed as young social scientists. In 
intellectual matters, if not necessarily in politics, they were conservative men. 
Although they were rebellious at times, they remained locked in debate with 
their original mentors throughout their careers.  
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